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POLICY INNOVATIONS IN THE DOMESTIC
PASSENGER-FARE INVESTIGATION
LUCILE SHEPPARD KEYES
N MARCH, 1974, the Civil Aeronautics Board completed its
work in the Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, a pro-
ceeding which had been instituted in January, 1970,' with the ob-
jectives of setting "rate-making standards with respect to the various
elements underlying both fare level and fare structure" and revising
existing fares where such action seemed called for.' Of the ten
phases into which the case was subsequently divided,' phases 5, 6,
and 9 appear to have resulted in major innovations in the Board's
basic rate-making policy. The following study addresses itself in
turn to the decisions in phases 6B (Load Factor), 5 (Discount
Fares), and 9 (Fare Structure). Though the decision in phase 6A
(Seating Configuration) also embodies an innovation in regulatory
principle, the relevant policy issues appear to be quite similar to
those related to phase 6B; therefore, phase 6A will not be con-
sidered here.
I CAB Order No. 70-1-147 (Jan. 29, 1970).
2 Id. at 2.
3 The case was divided into the following phases: I (Flight Equipment Depre-
ciation), 2 (Treatment of Leased Aircraft), 3 (Treatment of Deferred Federal
Income Taxes), 4 (Joint Fares), 5 (Discount Fares), 6A (Seating Configuration),
6B (Load Factor), 7 (Fare Level), 8 (Rate of Return), and 9 (Fare Structure).
The original division into nine phases was made by CAB Order No. 7-2-121
(Feb. 26, 1970); phase 6 was subdivided by CAB Order No. 70-11-91 (Nov. 19,
1970). In phase 4, the following decisions were issued: CAB Order Nos. 72-4-42
(April 10, 1972), 72-6-29 (June 6, 1972), and 74-3-80 (March 18, 1974); in
phase 5, CAB Order Nos. 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972), 73-5-2 (-, 1973), and
73-8-55 (Aug. 10, 1973); in phase 6A, CAB Order Nos. 71-4-48 (April 19,
1971), 72-5-10 (- , 1972), and 73-6-102 (June 26, 1973); in phase 6B, CAB
Order Nos. 71-4-54 (April 9, 1971), and 74-3-81 (March 18, 1974); in phase
7, CAB Order Nos. 71-4-59/60 (April 9, 1971), 72-8-50 (Aug. 10, 1972), and
72-9-78 (-, 1972); in phase 8, CAB Order Nos. 71-4-58 (April 9, 1971),
and 71-7-43 (- , 1971); and in phase 9, CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March 18,
1974).
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DECISION ON LOAD FACTOR
Regulation of the fare level involves three basic determinations:
(a) the value of the investment which will be allowed for rate-
making purposes, (b) the rate of return on investment which should
be earned by the carriers, and (c) the actual level of prices which
should be set in order to produce this desired return. To calculate
(c), given (a) and (b), it is obviously necessary to postulate some
level of costs per unit sold, and this cost level will in turn depend
on, among other things, assumptions as to the utilization of avail-
able capacity-notably, an assumption as to the revenue passenger
load factors experienced by the carriers. For any given level of
costs (e.g., average costs per available seat-mile), costs per unit
sold vary inversely with the amount of capacity utilized. If only
half the seats in a plane are filled with paying customers, capacity
costs per revenue passenger-mile (estimated at 65 percent of total
costs)' will be twice as high as they would be if all the seats had
been sold. As a general rule, regulatory agencies employ cost pro-
jections based on past experience and the predictions of the regu-
lated companies, together with the underlying assumptions as to
capacity utilization, without seeking to adjust these figures to allow
for improved utilization deemed advisable by the regulators. In
other words, it is normally assumed (at least in this connection)
that the regulated companies may be relied upon not to engage
in unwarranted extravagance.
In its decision on load factor, however, the Board executed a
decisive departure from this normal assumption. Instead of accept-
ing the "actual or projected load factors that will result from the
forecasts of traffic and operational plans of the carriers not shown
to constitute uneconomical or inefficient management," the agency
decided to specify "standard or optimum load factors, which would
be capable of achievement over the long-range," and fix fares "at
a level which would produce a reasonable return on investment
assuming that the industry operated at the standard load factor."'
For the trunkline carriers, the standard was fixed at 55 percent.
4 CAB Order No. 71-4-54 at 4 (April 9, 1971): "Approximately 65 percent
of airline costs are related to the operation of aircraft and are not affected by




The Board originally also specified a standard for the local service
airlines (44.4 percent), but this standard was later abandoned as
inappropriate owing to the "developing state of these carriers."'
Though the adoption of the load factor standard represented a
new departure, the idea was not a new one to the Board. The
agency had considered using such a standard in the General Pas-
senger Fare Investigation' concluded in 1960. Such standards, as
well as specific average capacity cost standards, had then been sug-
gested by the Board's Bureau of Air Operations, on the ground that
"failure on the part of a carrier to attain, over a reasonably ex-
tended period, the load factors and capacity costs projected for
it ... would reflect inefficient and uneconomical management, ab-
sent a basic change in underlying economic and operating condi-
tions." (This version of the Bureau's ground for its recommenda-
tion was not accepted by the Board in its more recent decision.)
Even in 1960, the Board registered approval of such standards in
principle; its decision not to adopt them was based on the un-
settled economic conditions then prevailing-notably the recent
business recession and the transition to jet aircraft-which had
produced significant disparities between forecast and actual airline
operating results during the pendency of the proceeding. In the
Board's words,
Our decision ... stems from the evidentiary content of the record,
and not from any decision that use of standards as such is unsuit-
able .... If fair standards could be ascertained for representative
periods which can be reasonably defined, it is clear that the Board
would be able to deal with the problems of determining appropri-
ate fare levels much more effectively. But it appears that develop-
ment of such standards must await a time when the industry has
reached a more stable period.'"
The 55 percent standard figure was calculated on the basis of
traffic data for the year 1969, when the actual trunkline load factor
was 50 percent. Data were obtained from the carriers concerning
the top 351 unduplicated city pairs for the middle month of each
quarter. Corrections for excess capacity were confined to "the 170
7 CAB Order No. 74-3-81 at 16 (March 18, 1974).
832 C.A.B. 291, 292 (1960).
9 1d. at 316.
10 Id. at 320.
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markets with an average of more than three round trips per day
per carrier carrying more than 10 percent of the traffic in the
market in 1969."" In the remaining markets, the existing level of
capacity was recognized, for rate-making purposes, as representing
an irreducible minimum necessary for adequate service.
For the 170 markets, "attainable" load factors were computed
by calculating the amount of capacity warranted under a formula
devised by the Board's Bureau of Economics, and dividing the
actual traffic by this calculated capacity figure. Warranted capacity
was determined "by calculating the number of flights necessary
with the average aircraft size used in the market to attain a 62-
percent reserved-seat load factor in the market and adding one flight
per day of the average aircraft size for the number of carriers com-
peting in the market who carried at least a 10 percent share of
the market traffic in the 1969 sample period.
12
Defending this formula, the Board observed that it was "the
Bureau's judgment that a 62 percent reserved-seat load factor
would represent adequate service for markets served by only one
carrier" and that "62 percent was the overall average load factor
achieved in monopoly markets in 1967."" As to the additional
capacity allowed, the Board stated:
The addition of seats equivalent to an average of one flight per
day per carrier in calculating market load factors gives recognition
to such factors as the number of competitors; the size and in-
divisibility of aircraft used; and load-factor fluctuations resulting
from seasonal and other traffic peaks and from aircraft positioning,
maintenance, and crew-rotation requirements. The decision to add
an average of one flight of average aircraft size every day for each
carrier is based on the judgment that this amount of additional
capacity would be sufficient to permit flexibility to account for such
variables and result in a reasonable relation of overall market
capacity and traffic demand. 4
The resulting figures were used to calculate attainable load factors
for the trunkline industry as a whole and for each trunkline carrier.
It is perhaps not surprising that there were objections to these
calculations on the part of the carriers. It seems evident, however,
"CAB Order No. 71-4-54 at 35 (April 9, 1971).
"Id. at 36.
13 Id. at 37.
"1Id. at 38-39.
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that the capacity corrections applied were very largely matters of
"judgment" (as, e.g., the Bureau's "judgment" on the load factor
representing "adequate" service in a monopoly market). However,
the 55 percent figure finally arrived at in fact fit quite comfortably
within the range of actual experience in the preceding fifteen years,
and thus appeared "reasonable" in the eyes of the Board.'
But more important than the credentials of the standards itself
is the question of why the agency felt it necessary to adopt such a
standard at all. Failure to do so, according to the Board, would
almost certainly lead to dire long-term consequences--declining
load factors, an increasing fare level, and general impecuniousness
among the carriers, all brought on by the misguided overcompeti-
tiveness of airline managements.
In the Board's view, a policy of basing fares on actual load factors
can only lead to increasing overcapacity, with the traveling public
being asked to pay higher fares to compensate the carriers for
the cost of operating an increasing number of empty seats. This
result is virtually inevitable because schedules constitute the major
competitive device of carriers in their efforts to preserve and en-
hance their participation in the traffic markets which they serve.
In any given market, the carrier with the greatest number of sched-
ules will normally carry the largest number of passengers. Thus,
the desire to maximize market participation creates powerful in-
centives to add capacity. The countervailing incentive is supplied
only by the imperative of economics: Schedules cannot be added
indefinitely if the load factors achieved are insufficient, at the pre-
vailing fare levels, to permit the carriers to cover costs and return
a profit. But this economic incentive loses its force if the carriers
are able to raise their fares to cover declining load factors. In that
event, the pressure of competition to add schedules will become
virtually irresistible and will inevitably lead to a long-term decline
in load factor, rising fares to support higher levels of unused capac-
ity, and, because of regulatory lag, a chronically depressed profit
level for the industry as a whole."
Taken at face value, this unlikely scenario would seem to imply
progressive adoption of more and more standards governing the
15 In holding that the Bureau's suggestions constituted reasonably attainable
load factors, the Board pointed out that "trunkline load factors from 1955 to
1969 . . . ranged from 50 to 64 percent," and that "[i]n eleven of those fifteen
years, trunkline load factors exceeded 55 percent, and the load factor reached the
low of 50 percent only in the most recent year (1969)." Id. at 33-34.
16Id. at 5.
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many dimensions of airline competition; managements motivated
in the described manner, deterred from overscheduling by the
Board's wise guidance, would presumably turn to other forms of
extravagance until at last the agency had closed every competitive
door. But the low load factors experienced by the industry in the
late 'sixties and early 'seventies, which were cited by the Board in
support of its theory of airline behavior,' can more plausibly be
explained as resulting from failure accurately to predict demand
conditions far enough in advance, a failing which, as was pointed
out by Vice Chairman Gillilland in his dissent, has been amply
shared by the Board itself. 8 Moreover, the absence of load-factor
standards in the past has not brought about the results called for
by the Board's theory. As the agency's own figures show, fifteen
years of experience show load factors on the whole comparing quite
favorably with the 55 percent level now adopted as a "reasonably
attainable" standard for regulatory purposes. 9 Rates of return in
the airline industry, though on the average much lower than the
12 percent decided to be adequate by the Board, have fluctuated
over the years, with periods of relatively marked prosperity in the
17 Id. at 15: "There is no dispute that capacity being provided considerably
exceeds traffic needs. In 1967, the trunkline load factor was 57.2 percent, and
the local-service load factor was 46.4 percent. There is no showing that service
was not generally adequate in 1967. Nevertheless, by 1969 the trunkline load
factor had dropped to 50 percent, and the local-service load factor to 42.9 per-
cent. For the year ending September 30, 1970, the trunkline load factor declined
further to 48 percent. The decline in load factors reflects an increase in unused
capacity resulting from substantial increases in schedule frequencies and aircraft
size."
18Id. at 7-9 (dissenting opinion): "Orders for new aircraft require a con-
siderable lead time. Likewise planning, design, production and testing of new air-
craft require a considerable time. Accordingly, judgment as to requirements must
be made years in advance. . . . What the imposition of load-factor standards
means is that the hazard of miscalculation will be greatly enhanced. . . . The
industry has recovered from former downturns [and] requires no compulsion
other than the ordinary economic law to deter it from excessive acquisitions of
aircraft. . . . It may be observed that in 1969, as a result of actions commenced
earlier, the Board added 25 percent to the mileage of the air route system, the
third largest percentage increase in its history. Carriers added in the neighbor-
hood of 10 percent to number of aircraft and 12 to average seats per aircraft .. "
The Vice Chairman also noted that "in the recent Transpacific case the Board
estimated that 1970 0 and D Mainland-Hawaii traffic would be 3,340,000, and
Mainland-beyond traffic 800,000, or a total flown of 4,140,000. In reliance thereon
it added five carriers to the three already serving Hawaii, all of which made
equipment preparations. Actual 1970 on-board loads between the Mainland and
Hawaii turned out to be 2,818,265, reflected a forecasting error of 31.9 percent."
'
9 CAB Order No. 71-4-54 at 33-34 (April 9, 1971).
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early and middle 'fifties and the middle 'sixties." And, of course,
these historical data do not show a rising trend in the fare level-
and certainly not in the real fare level (i.e., the fare level corrected
to take into account movements in general prices)1
Moreover, like all similar contentions that regulated firms tend
to extravagance because of a supposed "fixed" or "guaranteed"
rate of return on investment, the Board's argument (even taken at
face value) produces simply a case for regulatory lag. If in fact the
regulated companies are not promptly and effectively rescued by
regulatory fare increases from the consequences of their misguided
actions, any incentive to engage in such actions will of course dis-
appear. In view of the recent financial record of the airline indus-
try, it does not seem at all necessary to belabor here the case for
regulatory lag. In fact, the regulatory rescue has not occurred, and
it is at least very doubtful that the required very large increase in
profits could have been brought about by Board-approved general
fare increases. An extremely strong incentive already exists for
avoiding future overinvestment, and a very substantial part of the
"burden" of existing overcapacity is being borne by airline inves-
tors, not the traveling public. Unlike the effect of regulatory lag,
the potential profit squeeze which could result from application of
the Board's load-factor standards is focussed on one particular
aspect of airline operations, and thus implies an arbitrary limitation
on management decisions as to capacity and service levels.
The Board's argument that carrier competition without load-
factor standards necessarily leads to chronic losses and higher fare
levels must be carefully distinguished from a superficially similar
view advanced by the Department of Transportation. In the latter
view, actual load factors tend to decrease to levels equal to break-
even load factors because of competitive additions to capacity;
however, the end result is not chronic financial loss but simply an
equilibrium, at normal rates of return, at a lower load-factor level
and consequently higher quality of service than would have prevail-
ed had fares been reduced rather than capacity expanded. Two types
of evidence tending to support this view were cited by the Board
in its Supplemental Opinion in phase 6-B: (i) time series showing
trends in actual and breakeven load factors for the domestic trunk-
20 CivIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 76 (1971).
21 Id. at 81.
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line carriers from 1963 through 1970, which indicate "that the
actual load factor has tended to follow the increases and decreases
in the break-even load factor with the general shape of both curves
being remarkably similar;"' and (ii) a comparison of actual and
breakeven load factors (in 1969) for various lengths of haul, which
shows that both decline as distance increases (except for the rela-
tively insignificant very short hauls), an indication interpreted by
the Board as demonstrating that "carriers ... operate at low load
factors if the fares are high enough to permit such operations; in
contrast, where fares are relatively low in relation to seat-mile costs,
carriers are forced to, and do, operate at higher load factors."'
While this evidence clearly does not support the Board's own case
for the use of load-factor standards, it is possible to argue that it
does support such a policy on other grounds; namely, that equi-
librium is attained at too high a level of service quality-that the
public interest requires a lower quality of service at a lower unit
cost. Such a view may indeed be read into some of the Board's own
statements, especially the following:
The high fare level which is the concomitant of a high-capacity,
low-load-factor service perforce restricts air travel to a smaller
segment of the public than would be the case with a lower-capacity,
high-load-factor service, and thus would be inconsistent with the
Congressional mandate that the Board consider "the need in the
public interest of adequate and efficient transportation of persons
and property by air carriers at the lowest cost consistent with the
furnishing of such service." There is no reason whatsoever to be-
lieve that the carriers cannot earn as high a return on investment
from the latter type of service as from the former, high-fare, high-
cost service. Moreover, a lower-fare, higher-load-factor service will
be of greater benefit to the public by allowing the traffic base to be
broadened. '
For all this writer knows it may be possible to find in the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Aeronautics Act some reference to air
fares, and the functions of the regulators in relation thereto, which
could be interpreted as showing some congressional advocacy of
the position here apparently being taken by the Board. However,
it is safe to say that the entire question of fare regulation played
"2 CAB Order No. 74-3-81 at 5 (March 18, 1974).
2 Id.
4 CAB Order No. 71-4-54 at 21-22 (April 9, 1971).
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a totally subordinate role in the development of the legislation and
also that there was no significant support for the wholly extraordi-
nary view that the agency created by the Act should promote cheap-
ness at the expense of quality.
The proposition that airline competition leads to an excessively
high quality of service has been more carefully defended in a study
containing an explicit cost-benefit calculation purporting to com-
pare the value of additional service frequency to the average
traveler with the cost to him which it entails.' As described by one
of its authors, this study shows
the relationship between the level of slack capacity of a scheduled
transport system with a generalized measure of the convenience
of the service, the expected schedule delay per passenger. This
variable measures the average difference of a typical traveller's most
preferred departure time and the time he can obtain a flight with
an available seat. One can demonstrate that for a given market,
the expected schedule delay per passenger decreases as the number
of flights increases, and as the average load factor decreases ...
For a given market ... there exists a range of "fair prices" which
are consonant with a "fair return" on investment. Related to each
price, however, is an implicit level of service quality in the system.
This range of feasible combinations of price and quality may be
regarded then as the opportunity locus of the regulators. The
"optimal" price, and by extension, the optimal level of slack capac-
ity, obviously depends on the value travellers attach to this dimen-
sion of quality, avoiding schedule delays. Under reasonable as-
sumptions concerning the value which travellers might place on
avoiding schedule delays, a pattern of optimal ALF's [market aver-
age load factors] and prices may be calculated. While the average
load factors arising from the regulated markets have ranged re-
cently from 45-55%, the range of optimal ALF's would appear to
be significantly higher, ranging from 50-55% in small markets of
short length to 70-75% in larger and/or longer distance markets.'
The authors of the study avoid dogmatic commitment to the par-
ticular trade-offs assumed between cost and delay, which they re-
gard as "based on information a good deal less complete than
ideal;" point out that their approach implies that "ceteris paribus,
22 Douglas and Miller, Quality Competition, Industry Equilibrium, and Efficien-
cy in the Price-Constrained Airline Market, AM. ECON. REV., Sept., 1974.
26 Paper by George W. Douglas entitled, Regulation of the U.S. Airline Indus-
try: An Interpretation, American Enterprise Institute, Jan. -, 1974, at 8-9. The
papers presented at this conference will be contained in a forthcoming volume to
be published by the Institute.
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the greater the number of price/quality options the better;" and
furthermore recognize "that presently the market does provide
air transportation in various configurations, characterized by wide
differences in cost and schedule delay." 7
Whatever one may think about the possibility of an optimum con-
stellation of air services, in all markets, being determined (and ap-
propriately revised in the light of changing demand and supply
conditions) by the regulators using cost-benefit ratios based on
direct measurements of public preferences, past experience would
seem to indicate that any needed innovations in price-service com-
binations are more likely to be promoted by permitting competition
by new entrants than by relying on regulatory initiatives.' More-
over, such a pro-competitive policy, with the implied relaxation of
fare regulation, would presumably lay to rest any lingering illusions
which might exist on the part of the carriers to the effect that the
Board will "bail them out" of the consequences of their competi-
tive indiscretions, and thus do away with whatever factual basis
might exist for the Board's conception of wasteful airline com-
petition.
Finally, it should be noted that a rigid adherence to load-factor
standards could have very undesirable consequences in certain
economic circumstances. Where relief from a depressed profit level
could be obtained by higher fares, but existing capacity is such
that high load factors can be attained only with low plane utiliza-
tion, the application of load-factor standards as outlined by the
Board could result in the prolongation of the period of low earn-
ings and a consequent even greater reliance on debt financing than
has been the case in recent years. This possibility exists if in the
27 Douglas and Miller, supra note 25, at 668. The authors here continue: "At
,ne end of the scale, charter flights provide the lowest price, but the greatest
:schedule delay. At the other extreme, corporate executives are whisked about the
-country in private jet aircraft at enormous cost, but with a very minimum of
schedule delay. Scheduled air transportation lies between these poles . . . at the
margin of excessive quality and price. Some quality differentiation, moreover,
does exist within the scheduled transport industry in this dimension. Stand-by
fares and 'leisure class' travel represent ways in which differentiation with regard
to stochastic delays is currently practiced, although in a very limited way. Of
,course, additional techniques could be developed for price/quality differentiation
within the regulatory environment, and in general such initiatives are to be en-
.couraged."
2 For some of the relevant experience, see the account in L.S. Keyes, FED-
ERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION, Ch. V (1951).
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application of such standards allowable costs are figured as if
capacity were immediately adjusted to the accommodation of the
traffic at the prescribed load factors. In fact, however, recent evi-
dence indicates that the Board may not adopt a rigid position in
this regard: in November, 1973, the agency permitted fare increases
based on a calculation apparently giving some consideration to the
existing "short-term" constraints upon capacity adjustment.'
DECISION ON DISCOUNT FARES
The issue of reasonableness
Though the discount fares specifically at issue in this proceeding
were limited to four-youth standby, youth reservation, family,
and Discover America-the major result of the decision in phase 5
was the establishment of the following set of general principles to
govern the disposition of all "discount and promotional fares not
based on cost savings:"
(1) Carriers should be free to utilize discount fares within their
managerial discretion, subject to the conditions that such fares are
not unjustly discriminatory and meet the profit-impact test;
(2) Promotional fare tariffs should contain expiration dates not to
exceed 18 months from the effective date; and
(3) Fare levels will be computed on a hypothetical full normal-
fare basis, i.e., as if the discount fares are not a part of the fare
structure."0
The question of discrimination will be dealt with in the latter
part of this section. To meet the profit-impact test, a fare must be
able to generate "sufficient additional traffic to more than offset
(i) the diversion of full-fare traffic and (ii) the added non-capacity
costs associated with the generated traffic, less any savings in cost
attributable to the nature of the services provided to the discount
traffic."'" The Board's method of estimating added costs for the
discount traffic specifically at issue in this proceeding can fairly
be described as "rough." For example, it is simply assumed that
there is an added cost level, equal to a fixed percentage of revenues,
which holds good in every U.S. airline travel market, at whatever
29 CAB Order No. 73-11-93 at 5-6 (Nov. 20, 1973).
"CAB Order No. 72-12-18 at 78 (Dec. 5, 1972).
31 Id. at 19.
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time or place, for each of the discount fares (25.6 percent for
family-fare traffic, 30 percent for the others)."
It was considered desirable to permit establishment of discount
fares on a temporary basis in order to provide airline managements
with the "tools needed to cope effectively with short-run condi-
tions," and in particular (i) to improve load factors during the
recurrent periods of excess capacity," (ii) to enhance traffic in new
or thinly developed markets, and (iii) to institute competitive in-
novations in fare policy.' On the other hand, the obligatory expira-
tion date and the provision regarding fare level computation were
designed as means of "preventing promotional fares from becom-
ing permanently embedded into the fare structure and thereby bur-
dening the general fare level and the normal-fare passenger. '
In further explanation of the policy regarding fare-level computa-
tion, the Board had this to say:
[W]e intend to fix the basic normal-fare level on the basis of the
revenues which would be realized and the expenses which would
be incurred in the absence of the promotional fares. This will in-
volve an adjustment of passenger yields to eliminate the dilution
caused by the discount fares, together with related adjustments to
traffic, expenses and investments."
The agency evidently expects that the effect of this computation
will be to penalize the offerer of discount fares; and, on the Board's
32 In defense of this figure, the Board pointed out that 30 per cent is "approxi-
mately the relationship which traffic-related expenses bear to total revenues."
The decision then continues: "It is recognized that this percentage exceeds what
might be termed the 'bare-bones' cost of handling small increments of additional
traffic in very short-run periods. However, the aggregate amount of discount
traffic we are here dealing with is substantial, and traffic-related costs (as op-
posed to capacity costs) will tend to fluctuate in proportion to traffic changes
even during the short-term period as defined herein. . . . It is true that some
traffic-related costs are non-variable in the short run (e.g., depreciation and rentals
of ground passenger facilities). However, since the 30 percent factor is based
upon the relation of total traffic-related costs to total revenues but is applied to
the discounted revenues realized from the discounted fares, the resultant costs
assigned represent substantially less than a full pro-rata share of traffic-related
expenses. Moreover, no provision is made for added capacity costs, although it is
apparent that some additional capacity will be operated, even in the short run,
to accommodate discount traffic. ... For family-fare traffic, .. a rate of 25.6
percent is used to reflect . . . group handling savings. Id. at 36-37.
33 Id. at 52.
3
4I d. at 53.
Id. at 53-54.
3 'Id. at 55.
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assumptions, it is not hard to see why. The basic reason for this
expectation is the Board's view that the cost of carrying discount
traffic is generally identical to that of carrying the normal-fare
passenger, and that traffic expansion by using discount fares does
not reduce unit costs, a view summed up as follows in the decision:
[S]ince the promotional fare services are essentially the same as
those provided to full-fare passengers, there are no inherent cost
savings which would justify the current differences in fares. More-
over, because airline costs are largely variable in the long term,
the carriage of additional traffic generated by promotional fares
does not produce reductions in unit costs in the long run."7
On these premises, no great effort will be required to calculate
the hypothetical average cost level which would exist if the discount
traffic were not carried: it will necessarily be the same as the actual
cost level. With a hypothetical yield equal to that from the normal-
fare traffic, the offerer of discount fares will be credited with a
hypothetical profit margin higher than he actually enjoys. Although
hypothetical traffic will presumably be smaller than actual traffic
by an amount equal to the traffic which the Board regards as "gen-
erated" by the discount fares (as opposed to "diverted" from regu-
lar-fare traffic), the actual investment figure will undoubtedly be
trimmed proportionally by the Board to produce a hypothetical
figure representing perfect adjustment of capacity to the lower
traffic level. Hence the hypothetical rate of return on investment
will be higher than the actual return, and the discount-offerer will
find his Board-estimated revenue needs, for fare-making purposes,
to be lower than he would have thought his needs to be on the
basis of actual operations.
The postulation of constant costs is also the basic underpinning
of the Board's main conclusion on discount fares, namely, that
"the pricing of promotional fares at below-average costs reduces the
average yields to non-compensatory levels in the long run unless
normal fares are raised to above-cost levels" 8 and, hence, that "all
of the discount fares burden the fare level when viewed over the
long run."' The same opinion on costs could have been used (but
was not) in support of the Board's conclusion that, contrary to the
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agency's previous belief, the expanded market made available by
a differentiated fare structure does not enable the carriers to pro-
vide a more desirable level of service for all of their customers,
including those who fly at higher fares. Here the Board relied
merely on calculations purporting to show that "the total amount
of traffic generated under the differentiated fare structure is only
minimally larger than the traffic which would be generated under
a non-differentiated fare structure with lower normal fares designed
to produce the same yields.'
A more persuasive argument, based on constant costs, could
have run as follows: Although it is perfectly possible, in theory,
that a superior product, not profitable under a one-price system,
could become so with differential pricing, this situation can never
occur if the costs of producing this product do not decline as output
rises. For if the product cannot be financed (at any output level)
by selling all of it at one price, (a), the demand curve (AR) lies
below the average cost curve (AC) throughout. On the other hand,
if the product can be financed at some output by discriminatory
pricing, (b) the area under the marginal cost curve (MC), which
is equal to total cost, must at this output be equal to or smaller than
the area under AR, which is equal to total discriminatory revenue
with perfect discrimination. Where costs are constant, AC = MC
throughout, and, in this situation, (a) implies that MC lies above
AR throughout. Therefore (b) cannot be fulfilled.
The flaw in the Board's reasoning does not seem to lie in its
apparently realistic conclusions that "the airline industry is one of
constant returns to scale"'" and that generated discount-fare traffic
has not been of such magnitude as to make possible widespread
utilization of larger aircraft than would otherwise have been em-
ployed.' What does not seem realistic is the agency's apparent
failure to recognize that these general observations merely scratch
the surface of the problem of costing any given category of traffic.
Of crucial importance here, of course, is the time and space pat-
tern of the particular traffic in question. Though the airline industry
may be unlike the railroad industry in not being "characterized by
40 Id. at 12.
41 Id. at 48.
41 Id. at 49.
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substantial fixed costs"'" (i.e., costs which are fixed with respect
to large variations in the level of traffic as a whole), the two are
alike in experiencing such phenomena as traffic peaking and geo-
graphical imbalance at various times and places, conditions which
may provide ample justification for discount pricing resulting in
reductions in unit overhead.
In the present case, it appears that much more could have been
made of the argument that the specific discount fares at issue were
being utilized in markets having demand patterns complementary
to that of the ordinary business travel market. Indeed, it seems
probable that the carriers' defense of these fares was not excessively
vigorous in view of the existing inflationary pressures on airline
costs and the resulting apparent desirability of general fare increases.
In this connection, it may be noted that discount-fare traffic repre-
sented a very large chunk of the total: 44.8 percent of all revenue
passenger-miles in 1970." It is also notable that although the Board
in its original decision declared its intention to offset the planned
elimination of the discount fares found to be unjustly discrimina-
tory (i.e., the youth and family fares) by a downward revision of the
general fare level,' this announced project was soon abandoned."
In general, it would be deplorable if justifiable discount fares
were to be discouraged-either directly or by way of fare level
regulation-on the basis of inadequate cost analysis. The Board's
realistic attitude toward possible non-discriminatory standby and
off-peak fares"' leads one to hope that the agency will not after all
adopt such a course. Indeed, it is plausible to interpret the decision
in phase 5 as representing not so much a general endorsement of
41 Id. at 48.
4Id. at 10.
5Id. at 14.
40 CAB Order No. 73-5-2 at 7 (May 1, 1973). Here the Board explained that
its action was "predicated upon a consideration of the latest financial results of
the industry, which indicate that by the time the remanded proceeding could be
completed, there is a real possibility that any reduction in normal fares resulting
from the remand would have to be offset by an increase in fare level if the
carriers are to have an opportunity to realize a fair return on investment under
the Board's rate-making standards."
""CAB Order No. 72-13-18 at 73 (-, 1972). "[W]e do not believe that
the use of standby and offpeak fares need be limited to particular classes of
persons in order to produce the desired traffic leveling effects, and we particularly
emphasize that nothing in this opinion could be construed as suggesting that
standby fares available to all are in any way discriminatory or otherwise un-
lawful."
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fully-allocated cost pricing as an attempt to discourage a presumed
perverse tendency on the part of the carriers to serve particular
classes of traffic at a loss. That a profit-oriented enterprise would
stand in need of such discouragement is, of course, hard to believe;
however, the Board purports to find grounds for such a belief in
the past character of the price regulation to which the industry
had been subject. "Under previous policies," said the Board,
the carriers have not had adequate incentives to consider the long-
term impact of promotional fares since rate-making practice has
permitted them to seek fare-level increases to offset declines in
yield stemming from the discount fares. With the normal-fare payer
thus available as a source of subsidization of discount-fare traffic,
it is entirely natural that airline marketing and pricing policy would
tend to be more affected by considerations of short-term revenue
advantage and traffic promotion, and less affected by the long-term
impact on operating results. 8
With respect to the "short-term revenue advantage" said to result
from discount fares which do not cover full long-term costs, the
Board further asserted that: "At any given point in time, the re-
tention of such a fare will be in the carrier's short-term interest,
since cancellation is apt to result in an immediate profit loss."' 9
This, of course, is not so. Such a fare is profitable only if excess
capacity exists; when capacity is perfectly adjusted to demand, the
desired level of utilization of equipment can (by definition) be
attained by accommodating only the fully remunerative traffic.
Thus the "below-cost" fare is profitable only when it serves to
utilize idle capacity.
As for traffic promotion for its own sake-even though it may
be unprofitable-this is a plausible managerial aim only on the
assumption that any profit deficiencies can and will be promptly
remedied by a timely regulatory helping hand. The counter-argu-
ment here is the same as that which is pertinent in the case of the
load-factor scenario. Past profit deficiencies have in fact not been
(nor, it seems likely, could they have been) remedied by Board-
granted general fare increases. Any surviving expectation that such
rescues will be forthcoming in the future should be effectively dam-
pened by the very real presence of regulatory lag. In short, there
4 Id. at 56-57.
,1 Id. at 51.
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seems to be little justification for the Board's fears regarding the
carriers' alleged tendency to overindulge in discount fares; more-
over, its apparent policy of discouraging discounts may result in a
rigidity of pricing which will effectively reduce the feasible level of
utilization of airline capacity over the long run.
The issue of discrimination
Before proceeding to consider the decision on fare structure, a
few words should be said about the Board's treatment of the issue
of unjust discrimination in connection with phase 5. Though the
Board here reversed its prior stand with respect to youth and family
fares," the decision embodies no major clarification of principle
or change of basic approach. The issue of unjust discrimination is
distinct from the issue of unreasonableness treated above. Thus,
it is possible for a fare to be reasonable though unjustly discrim-
inatory (e.g., the youth standby fares if made applicable for only
eighteen months from the date of their approval); unreasonable
though not unjustly discriminatory (e.g., the Discover America
fares if not subjected to such a time limitation); unreasonable and
unjustly discriminatory (e.g., the youth reservation and family
fares); or, of course, reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory
(e.g., the Discover America fares with the eighteen-month time
limitation).
According to the Board's interpretation of the statute, discount
fares are prima facie discriminatory if they are available to "limited
classes of persons.""1 By this criterion, the youth and family fares
are prima facie discriminatory, whereas the Discover America
fares are not. But prima facie discrimination does not amount
per se to a violation of the statute; fares meeting this criterion can
still be lawful if justified by "substantial over-riding considerations
involving the sound development of the air transportation sys-
tem." The Board's unfavorable finding on the youth and family
fares is based on new evidence purportedly showing "that the de-
velopmental benefits flowing from the promotional-fare structure
in general and the youth and family fares in particular are in fact
minimal compared to those which we envisioned in our earlier
decisions and are insufficient to justify the discriminations," and
50 Id. at 61-62.
51 Id. at 60.
31 Id. at 64.
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that "the fares have had an unfavorable long-run impact on the fare
level and ultimately have burdened the normal-fare passenger. '
Though it is not made clear what scale of "developmental bene-
fits" would be adequate to counteract prima facie discrimination,
the Board's calculations with respect to the youth and family fares
do provide us with examples of induced traffic expansion which do
not so qualify, at least when accompanied by evidence that the
fares in question result in a burden on other traffic."' In general,
we can conclude only that fares producing no more than these
amounts of traffic expansion, burdening other traffic, and also quali-
fying as prima facie discriminatory will be disapproved, and that
satisfying the profit-impact test (as the youth standby fares in fact
did)"6 will not save them even for a temporary period.
DECISION ON FARE STRUCTURE
Distance and class relationships
In this proceeding the Board addressed itself to the question of
the proper relationships among fares for different distances of travel
and for different normal classes of service. The resulting decision 6
sets forth the underlying principles which, in the Board's view,
should govern such relationships, and furthermore provides precise
formulae for the calculation of the fares. Thus, in the text of the
order accompanying the decision, the following formula for coach
fares was prescribed, to be put into effect by the carriers in tariffs
to be effective 120 days from the date of decision:
Line-Haul Charge
Terminal Charge Mileage Cents per Mile
$12.56 0-500 7.06
501-1500 5.39
1501 and over 5.18
83 Id.
4 Id. at Appendices I, J, and K. For the youth standby fare, the estimated
percentages of induced traffic expansion (as compared with the traffic which would
have moved had those fares been cancelled and the level of normal fares reduced
to produce an average yield equal to that actually experienced) for 1969, 1970,
and 1971, are 1.66 percent, 1.90 percent, and 1.71 percent, respectively. Cor-
responding figures for the youth reservation fare are .37 percent, .32 percent, and
.47 percent. For the family fare, the corresponding figures are 1.42 percent, 1.14
percent, and 1.28 percent.
66Id. at 72.
66 CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March 18, 1974).
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The tariffs were also to conform to the following prescribed mini-
mum percentage relationships between first-class and coach (or,
in some cases, "standard or jet custom") fares:
Percentage Relationship
Distance (miles) to Coach Fares
Up to 349 137
350-849 138
850-1749 140
1750 and above 141
For economy-class service, the fare charged was to be no more
than $4 lower than the normal coach fare.'
In both cases, the prescribed formula was designed as a first step
toward placing the fare relationships squarely on a fully-allocated
cost basis. For first-class fares, a time-table was set for further
steps in this direction, the finally desired relationship being required
to take effect on July 1, 1976. 8 For distance relationships, it was
simply provided that the carriers would be permitted to "file tariffs
which change the level and/or taper of coach fares, provided that
any changes in taper must move the coach-fare curve closer to
the cost curve at all distances.""
It was decided not to prescribe immediately a fully "cost-based"
distance fare pattern, which, on the Board's calculations, would
have resulted in a substantial increase in the level of short-haul
fares (while reducing fares for very long hauls), because of the
possibility that such immediate action would have a disruptive
effect on carrier operations. On this point, the Board explained:
The record does not enable us to predict with any confidence the
impact [of the new formula] on short-haul traffic .... In addition,
the current operations of the carriers are undoubtedly geared in
many respects to the present fare structure. Several carriers have
cited the use, under the present structure, of short-haul traffic to
feed and support long-haul services. The kinds and amounts of
aircraft now in the carriers' fleets necessarily reflect the present
fare structure and attendant traffic patterns. In short, we have a
serious concern that a drastic change in fare structure might, in
-7This sum was believed to be "a reasonable approximation of the average
cost of a coach meal." Id. at 134.
58The final percentages are to be 150, 155, 160, and 163 percent for the
mileage blocks indicated in the above table. See the order accompanying the
decision.
"1 CAB Order No. 74-3-82 at 175 (March 18, 1974).
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the near term, have an adverse impact on the transportation system
as a whole."0
Similarly, the delay in imposing the final class formula was ex-
plained by reference to the possible impact on carrier finances of
an abrupt rise in first-class fares, then generally only 130 percent
of the coach level:
We are mindful of the adverse short-run consequences that could
flow from immediately increasing first-class fares to the full extent
of the cost ratio. Such action ought to have an impact on the con-
figuration of the carriers' aircraft to the extent that the increase in
the spread between first-class and coach fares diverts first-class
traffic to coach service. Thus, the carriers should be given some
reasonable period of time in which to adjust their operations and
facilities.6
A relatively short period of grace was believed to be sufficient for
the adjustment of the class relationship because the first-class traffic
deterred by higher fares would probably not be wholly lost to the
airlines, but rather diverted to coach service.
Because of their subsidized status, local-service airlines were
permitted to file tariffs ranging from 100 to 130 percent of the pre-
scribed levels. The Board thought it desirable to allow them "suffi-
cient flexibility to test in the marketplace fares designed to maxi-
mize revenues without unduly impairing the movement of traffic."6
Two main lines of argument were advanced by the Board in
support of its "cost-based" distance fare structure. First, it was
argued that short-haul fares below fully-allocated cost "arbitrarily
limit" the service provided in these markets, and that, conversely,
long-haul fares above fully-allocated cost provide an incentive for
"excessive service" on the routes to which they apply. Both of
these arguments must rest on a theory that airline managements
are motivated by something other than the search for profit: if the
short-haul traffic could support the same or a higher level of serv-
ice at a higher fare than the existing one, there is no apparent
reason to suppose that a fare lower than this would have been
instituted in the first place, and, if it had been, it would presumably
be promptly corrected. As for the supposition that long-haul profits
60 Id. at 73.
61 Id. at 126-127.
621 d. at 141.
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tend to be dissipated by over-scheduling, it is based on the same
analysis as that advanced in support of the load-factor standards,
and is equally incompatible with rational management (especially
when that management has no cushion of excess returns to soften
the impact of its mistakes). Examples of recent over-scheduling in
certain long-haul markets can be readily explained by the existence
of temporary over-all excess capacity which is put to use where
available traffic offers hope for revenues more than covering added
costs.
The second line of argument consists of a rejection of the case for
"cross-subsidization," which is said to be "the primary justification
for a fare structure that is less tapered than the cost structure.'
3
Support of short-haul services by excess profits derived from long-
haul traffic is here declared to be not only inequitable " but actually
unworkable in the airline industry as it is actually structured:
[C]ross-subsidization could be completely effective only if the do-
mestic air transportation system consisted of a singly monopoly
carrier. Since not all carriers have an equal mix of long-haul and
short-haul routes, those carriers having predominantly short-haul
routes, and relatively few medium and long-haul routes, do not
have an opportunity to gain the excess profits from long-haul routes
necessary to cross-subsidize short-haul routes. . . By the same
token, under the cross-subsidization theory, predominantly long-
haul carriers are allowed to charge above-cost fares in longer
markets in order to cross-subsidize short-haul markets which, to a
great extent, they do not possess.... In sum, while many parties
rely, either implicitly or explicitly, on cross-subsidization, the record
does not establish its workability as a feature of the fare structure
in the long run.'
Here one can only welcome the Board's refusal to hold that sub-
sidization of short-haul by long-haul traffic in the airline industry
is workable or desirable. The contrary view has, of course, for
many years been a favorite weapon of those who advocate protec-
tive certification, and the Board has therefore given weighty sup-
port to those who argue for its abolition.
With respect to class relationships, the Board's reasoning is the
18 Id. at 71.
64 Id. at 69. "A] structure of fares based on costs will be equitable to passen-
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same as that employed in connection with discount fares. There
is the same alleged "tension between short-term and long-run con-
siderations," and the same belief that fares below fully-allocated
cost must become unprofitable in the long run when "embedded in
the fare structure."6 Here again, one may note that such fares are
not profitable in the short run except where excess capacity exists,
and that it is highly unlikely that all excess capacity will disappear
in the long run, except in the theoretical sense which defines the
"long run" in terms of its disappearance. This sort of "long run"
is generally not what happens in the real world "after a long while"
or "for a long time"; what actually exists is a series of short runs
(and fragmented markets) requiring fare flexibility to secure opti-
mum utilization of capacity. Where excess capacity does disappear,
a profit-maximizing management will not pursue a policy of charg-
ing below-average cost prices;"7 and the mere existence of price
regulation in its traditional form cannot be adduced to rationalize
a contrary policy.
Fare flexibility
An illuminating sidelight on the Board's fare policy is cast by its
treatment, in the decision in phase 9, of proposals for fare flexi-
bility, i.e., various suggestions that a "zone of reasonableness,"
within a certain percentage range (set at 5 or 15 percent) of the
prescribed level, be established, fares within which zone would be
regarded as either prima facie or per se reasonable."
As the Board noted, proponents of price flexibility held that it
would bring about two major advantages: (i) the encouragement
of price competition, and (ii) the facilitation of carrier initiatives
"to adjust fares to the level of costs on a market basis." 9 Principal
advocate of promoting price competition through fare flexibility
was the Department of Justice, which argued that freedom to com-
pete in the price dimension would "encourage efficient operations"
and "reduce the industry's present tendency to channel competitive
MId. at 125.
6 0 Of course, this does not mean that profit-maximization cannot bring about
discriminatory pricing. But no maximizer of profit ever charges a price below
marginal cost; and when capacity is fully utilized, average cost is equal to mar-
ginal cost. Therefore when capacity is fully utilized, no maximizer of profit will
charge any price below average cost.
66 Id. at 108.
" Id. at 118.
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forces into expensive service rivalry.""0 According to the Depart-
ment:
[Flares in the past have been set by a process which results in a
uniform Board-established and enforced fare structure. The De-
partment believes that this system of uniform pricing has forced
competition into non-price areas, e.g., flight frequencies, equip-
ment types, seating configurations, and other service amenities, re-
sulting in a constantly improving quality of service, but at signifi-
cantly increasing cost. The Department believes that the public, if
free to choose, would prefer a lesser quality of service at prices re-
flecting its lower cost. Competitive pricing, it argues, would permit
carriers to experiment with fares and service to determine what
combination of price and service is most preferred in particular
markets.7
In answer to this argument, the Board had only to point out that
in fact no such Board-prescribed passenger-fare level or structure
had been in existence, and that carriers had been free to set their
own fares, subject to the Board's power to suspend and investigate.
Less cogent, however, is the agency's further contention that, under
this regime, "Price competition in normal fares has been virtually
nonexistent."7 This sweeping statement involves an exceedingly
lame dismissal of the fact of widespread fare discounts in the rela-
tively recent past,"3 and a refusal even to consider the relevance of
the origins of air coach.'4
This alleged virtual non-existence of price competition is attri-
buted by the Board to the "economic structure of the industry"
with characteristically oligopolistic, closed-entry markets brought
about by protective regulation. After invoking the well-known argu-
ment to the effect that oligopolistic interdependence deters price
reductions, the Board had this to say:
Congress has subjected to regulation and control both entry into
70 d. at 109.
7  Id. at 109-10.
3Id. at 116.
'31d. at 116. "In recent years, the carriers have, however, engaged in ex-
tensive discount fare competition which was the subject of our exhaustive opinion
in Phase 5 of this investigation, and is not further considered herein."
11ld. at 116. "[I]t should be emphasized that the above discussion is con-
cerned with standard class fares, and does not consider carrier proposals for
introduction of new lower-cost forms of service at fare levels below existing
fares, e.g. the introduction of coach service by Capitol Airlines in 1948 at a level
approximately two cents below first-class passenger-mile rates."
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the industry and entry into individual markets, with the result that
the number of competitors over individual routes is necessarily
limited. . . . As a consequence, effective competition on all but
a few individual city-pair markets is confined to a relatively limited
number of carriers-and many markets are served by only one
carrier. Under these circumstances, to expect pricing behavior rep-
resentative of a truly competitive market structure is ingenuous at
best, and it is therefore not surprising that competition in basic
fares has been virtually non-existent."
One does not have to subscribe to a dogmatic numbers-based theory
of markets to agree that deterrence to potential competition by pro-
tective entry control probably exerts a dampening effect on price
competition; after all, the original air coach initiative did come
from outside the certificated industry, and emphasis on price com-
petition has apparently been greater in intrastate than in interstate
air transportation (where the former has not been subject to pro-
tective certification)."
As to the second advantage claimed for fare flexibility, the Board
held flatly that airline management has no incentive to develop a
fare structure reflecting cost conditions in individual markets.
Nor is there any likelihood that under fare flexibility carriers will
adjust fares to the level of actual costs on a market-by-market
basis, that fare reductions would be made in those markets in which
actual costs are below industry average cost for the stage length
involved, or that fares would be raised only in markets where cost
or other justification exists. Managements' basic incentive is the
maximization of revenues [sic], and not adjusting fares to costs.
Accordingly, in markets where the value of service exceeds the
formula fare, carriers would seek to raise fares to the maximum
amount permitted resulting in fares based upon whatever the traffic
will bear, irrespective of the cost of service."
This point of view ignores the very large extent to which the aims
of a profit-maximizing management are entirely consonant with
the interests of the consuming public. Thus the aim of profit-
maximization insures that there will be no carriage of traffic at a
loss, so that the remainder of the traffic must be burdened;"' like
75 1d. at 117-18.
7B See W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPER-
FECTIONS (1970).
71 CAB Order No. 74-3-82 at 120-21.
78 An exception may be found in the case of such industries as railroad trans-
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the minimization of expenses for any given output, which is also
a basic managerial aim, cost coverage in each individual market
is an important aspect of the public's interest in getting the most
for its money. Since this is true, excessive returns in any market
will show up as excessive returns for the enterprise as a whole; as
long as excessive returns do not exist, we can be reasonably sure
that the structure of prices does not depart significantly from that
dictated by costs (though not, of course, that the price structure
reflects fully-allocated costs).
On the other hand, the Board seems to be on perfectly solid
ground in concluding that the adoption of fare flexibility would
"eliminate meaningful regulation of passenger fares," in that it
"would nullify our laborious efforts to achieve a rational, equitable
and cost-oriented fare structure." 9 Whether these laborious efforts
were worthwhile in the first place is, of course another question,
which has been dealt with at some length in the present study.
CONCLUSION
All three major regulatory innovations instituted as a result of
the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation-the adoption of load-
factor standards, the establishment of more rigid rules governing
discount fares, and the prescription of fully-allocated cost standards
for distance and class relationships among normal fares-are de-
fended by the Board on the basis of a theory that management
motivation in the Federally regulated airline industry is radically
different from that of the ordinary, unregulated, profit-maximizing
firm. In essence, the contention is that the regulated carriers are
impelled toward and encouraged to continue wasteful policies be-
cause of the expectation that any resulting profit deficiencies can
and will be expeditiously remedied by compensatory general price
increases put into effect by the regulators. In view of the history
of actual rates of return on airline investment, and of the very real
existence of regulatory lag, it is hard to believe that the described
expectation could persist.
If the Board's theory were correct, however, two consequences
portation, where the importance of the services of the carrier to competing cus-
tomers may give rise to opportunities for anti-competitive discrimination. See
Keyes, Price Discrimination in Law and Economics, S. EcON. J., April, 1961.
9 CAB Order No. 74-3-82 at 121 (March 18, 1974).
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would follow. First, it seems evident that the innovations of the
Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation would be insufficient to
deal with the implied general tendency toward wastefulness. More
and more of the Board's custodial care would be gradually required,
with no end in sight until perhaps the last avenue of competitive
endeavor is closed. Second, if existing regulation in this field leads
to perverse motivation and indefinite extension of bureaucratic
control, it would seem more than ever advisable to consider the
obvious alternative of drastically reducing the scope of regulation
and opening the field to new competition. For some, at least, this
alternative should be made more attractive by the Board's rejection
of "cross-subsidization" as a desirable and workable goal for regu-
latory policy.
Notes

